During the so-called 'Baghdad Spring' of early 2005 the Arab Middle East appeared to witness the regional reformist upheaval that neo-conservative proponents of the decision to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 had prognosticated (Kagan and Kristol, 2002; Muravchik, 2002) . Given the enduring ability of authoritarian Arab regimes to fend off domestic and (cautious) external pressure for political reform, this article moves beyond the assessment and critique of the Bush administration's (mis)application of the 'democratic peace' thesis with regard to the Iraq War (Ish-Shalom, 2007/8; Pickering and Pecency, 2006; Russett, 2005) . Shifting the emphasis from the domestic aspects of democratisation and the democratisation agendas and strategies of external actors like the United States and the European Union, it aims to demonstrate the insufficiencies of external democratisation efforts that rely on a crude reading of the 'modernisation' school of thinking and ignore not only the insights of the 'transition' school with regard to the international dimensions of democratisation but also the increasing body of literature dealing with causes of authoritarian resilience in the Arab world.
1 Through case studies of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two countries sharing close strategic relationships with the United States, yet differing in the socio-economic foundations of authoritarianism and experiences with managing external and domestic calls for political reform, the article aims to contribute to the wider academic debate on the international dimension of authoritarian resilience. 2 After an initial overview of the problems associated with Washington's emphasis on the modernisation approach, this article will synthesise insights of the transition school's understanding of democratisation as well as recent work on the resilience of authoritaridoi: 10.1111/j. 1467-9248.2010.00853.x anism in the Middle East, in order to highlight the failure to make credible use of positive and negative conditionality as the 'missing link' in explaining the Arab world's democratic exception.
Taking the Long Term View: The Modernisation School as a Rationale for a 'Hands-Off' Approach to Democratisation
After the events of 11 September 2001, leading US diplomats admitted that decades-old policies which had subordinated the goal of expanding the 'Third Wave' of democratisation to the Middle East to safeguarding other perceived national interests (Anderson, 2001; Berger, 2009 ) were partly to blame for sustaining the region's 'democratic exception' (Haass, 2002) . When Secretary of State Colin Powell unveiled the so-called Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) at the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington DC as the main vehicle to address these shortcomings, he bemoaned the 'condescending notion' that 'freedom could not grow' in the Middle East. Declaring that 'Any approach to the Middle East that ignores its political, economic, and educational underdevelopment will be built on sand' (Powell, 2002) , he made clear that the state department-led efforts on political reform in the Arab world would be informed by the analysis of the modernisation school. First propagated by Seymour Martin Lipset, this approach emphasises the structural preconditions for democracy and quantifiable indices, such as wealth measured in per capita income, industrialisation, urbanisation and education (Lipset, 1993) . In his classic assessment of the preconditions for Middle Eastern democracy Charles Issawi therefore deemed nothing less than 'a great economic and social transformation which will strengthen society and make it capable of bearing the weight of the modern State' to be 'a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for the establishment of genuine democracy' (Issawi, 1956, p. 41) . Obviously such grandiose prescriptions can easily justify external support for authoritarian regimes on the grounds that the relevant country has demonstrated 'insufficient' socioeconomic development (Grugel, 1999) . At least they explain why those interested in whether or not the United States can actually promote democracy deemed the modernisation literature 'curiously unsatisfying' (Allison and Beschel, 1992, p. 85). 3 The decision to put MEPI's management under the leadership of Deputy-Assistant Secretary of State Liz Cheney, daughter of then Vice-President Dick Cheney, and into the hands of the state department's Near East bureau meant that, initially, 70 per cent of all grants went directly to Arab governments and only 17.5 per cent to representatives of Arab civil society (Carothers, 2005; Wittes, 2004b) . 4 The tendency of MEPI officers to seek approval for their projects from respective Arab governments further limited the programme's effectiveness in promoting genuine political reform (Wittes and Yerkes, 2006) : 'In the words of one friend in the White House, the typical aid recipient in the Middle East is the son of an ambassador, with a German mother, who happens to run an ngo' (Alterman, 2004) .
With MEPI quickly becoming a vehicle for the 'authoritarian upgrading' of Arab regimes (Heydemann, 2007) , the promise of a free trade zone with the region ( Wayne, 2003) and privileged bilateral trade agreements or World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership for 'peaceful' countries (Zoellick, 2003) constituted another pillar of the Bush administration's attempts to apply the modernisation school's concepts. It followed the hypothesisattractive to policy makers looking for a loftier framing of the parochial interest in the spread of free market economies -that capitalism contributes to democratisation by requiring the rule of law to function properly (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2009) as well as by creating demands for political participation from a skilled workforce used to independent thinking and articulation (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009 ).
As a comparatively rich country with a per capita GDP of roughly US$20,000 in 2008 Saudi Arabia challenges the conventional wisdom that posits a direct link between economic wealth and democracy. In fact, if one accepts that 'post-materialist liberty aspirations' increase the likelihood of authoritarian failure ( Welzel and Inglehart, 2005) , then the largest of the oil-rich countries of the Arab peninsula would be a prime candidate.
5 Yet in Saudi Arabia supposedly reform-conducive social orientations contrast with a political reality where resource-based external rents and the associated 'segmented clientelism' (Hertog, 2005) Saudi Arabia's rankings are not surprising to those who see economic growth as a precondition, not for the establishment, but for the political stability of a democracy (Dorenspleet, 2004; Pevehouse, 2002; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) . 7 In light of the postulate that integration into the global economy increases potentially reform-inducing linkages and decreases an authoritarian regime's ability to curtail them (Levitsky and Way, 2005; Way and Levitsky, 2006) , a free trade approach might expand the still limited Western leverage over Saudi Arabia. In fact, reflecting a broader change in business culture in the Arab Gulf region which some regard as a possible step towards greater political transparency (Ehteshami and Wright, 2007) , representatives of the country's business elite have already moved closer into the current centre of decision making and even felt emboldened to push for a modernisation of the curriculum (Glosemeyer, 2004, pp. 143-6 ). Yet sceptics warned that while the promise of WTO membership provided King Abdullah with political cover for his cautious attempts to tackle the widespread corruption within the extended royal family, 8 such developments might only lead to a 'highly truncated version of the rule of law' aimed at enhancing a regime's domestic position (Carothers, 2007, pp. 15-6). 9 The observation that the link between economic growth and democratic transitions is stronger in poorer countries (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) would appear to make Egypt an easier candidate to apply the insights of the modernisation school. In reality, however, US-Egyptian relations constitute in many ways a particularly striking example of how the modernisation school can provide a rationale for governmentfriendly mechanisms that end up supporting an (increasingly) authoritarian status quo.
In a pre-9/11 example typical of the Clinton administration's approach, both governments set up a bilateral private-sector 'Presidents' Council' which was charged with supporting the implementation of market reforms in Egypt. Led by Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal on the Egyptian side, it served as an important additional stabiliser of the regime by increasing the number of contacts for Egyptian businessmen among the Egyptian and, equally important, US political elite (Alterman, 2000; Momani, 2003) . It thus further cemented a situation where political change threatens the interests of those capitalists who owe their economic status to the regime (Richter, 2007; Sfakianakis, 2004) . 10 When the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, which many of Gamal Mubarak's closest associates continue to dominate (King, 2007) , became a recipient of National Endowment for Democracy funds from 1993 to 2002, 11 US democracy assistance even ended up supporting the domestic and international networking of the heir apparent of Egypt's authoritarian ruler.
US policies thus played a significant role in facilitating Cairo's shift from the allocation of rent income to broad segments of society to co-opting business interests -a policy necessitated by the structural readjustment programmes demanded by international donors in the 1980s and 1990s (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004; King, 2007) . By helping pre-empt the emergence of alternative power centres among the Arab world's business elites, Washington strengthened what comparative studies have described as an important contributor to the stability of authoritarianism in the region (Bellin, 2004; Kamrava and O'Mora, 1998; Langohr, 2004) .
In addition, the long-standing US approach to free trade might even intensify the region's social problems as long as transnational investors can easily exploit existing social structures (Moore and Schrank, 2003) . The associated increase of inequalities in income distribution further exacerbates what, as the modernisation approach admits, constitutes a serious obstacle to democracy (Issawi, 1956; Lipset, 1993) and explains Egypt's return to an era of political de-liberalisation as the direct outcome of the regime's attempts to exclude the losers of economic liberalisation from the political process (Kienle, 2001 ).
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The 'Baghdad Spring' and the External Dimension of Authoritarian Resilience in the Arab World
With the image of democratisation firmly established at least on the level of US official discourse, if not policy, it was not surprising that in the context of the shifting justifications for the Iraq War President Bush turned to this issue as an overarching public rationale for his administration's policy towards the Middle East. Focusing on the establishment of Iraq as a 'regional beacon' (Enterline and Greig, 2005) , the neo-conservative assumption of a 'regional tsunami' (Muravchik, 2002 ) that would overwhelm the surrounding authoritarian regimes could have found some theoretical underpinnings within the transition approach established by Dankwart Rustow (1970) and later represented most prominently by Guillermo O'Donnell et al. (1986) . The emphasis on the decisions of political actors over material conditions (Schmitz and Sell, 1999) and the powerful effects of (regional) diffusion (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Grugel, 1999; Schmitter, 2001 ) made this approach attractive for policy makers and those working in the democratisation business eager to see democracy promotion take place despite real or perceived social, economic or even cultural obstacles (Carothers, 2002) . In contrast to the modernisation approach where the international sphere features only indirectly through the promotion of economic development, the transition school examines the international context for patterns of 'contagion' within regional clusters,'neutral transmission mechanisms', as well as the exercise of control by an external actor through 'sticks' and 'carrots' ( Whitehead, 2001 ).
At first glance, the fragile democratisation process in Iraq seemed to confirm the conventional wisdom that external threats and international conflicts explain the lack of democracy in the Arab Middle East (Gause, 1995) . It allowed authoritarian regimes and their media allies to delegitimise external and domestic calls for reform by linking them to a US project of domination (Ehteshami and Wright, 2007) . 13 Yet developments in Saudi Arabia and Egypt show that (increased) popular hostility towards US policies might actually undermine authoritarian resilience.While neo-conservatives had hoped to create pressure on Arab regimes through the symbol of US success in Iraq, it was now the Arab governments' failure to stop the perceived US 'aggression' that increased domestic demands for political reform. For instance, the signatories of a January 2003 letter to then Crown Prince Abdullah astutely played on the widespread fear that Saudi Arabia itself could become a target of the 'war on terror' (Aarts, 2004) by presenting their call for reform as a pledge to stand with their leaders 'in facing all dangers which threaten our country's present and future' (Saudi National Reform Document, 2003).
14 As had happened in the aftermath of the 1990-1 Gulf War crisis (Dekmejian, 1998) , the Saudi regime reacted with seemingly inclusive reform measures. First among them was then Crown Prince Abdullah's 'National Dialogue', which provided a forum for unprecedented discussions on religious differences, education, gender, extremism and the prospect of municipal elections (Kechichian, 2004) .
In Egypt, the nationalist opposition benefited from the fact that Cairo felt pressured to allow and even co-opt large-scale demonstrations against the Iraq War. As a member of al-Wafd, Egypt's near-dormant liberal opposition party, explained,'it would have been a real shame to see massive rallies in the US and Britain and not in Egypt' (quoted in Shahin, 2003) . In the end, the anti-Iraq demonstrations that occurred with and without governmental support in Egypt in early 2003 marked the beginning of an increasing association between regional crises and national affairs in the public's mind. As had happened during the 1977 bread riots (this time assisted by email and cell phones), formerly politically unaffiliated people became active in setting up and participating in previously unthinkable public demonstrations on a subject of broad public concern. The audacity of the 'Kefaya' ('Enough') movement in breaking the taboo on public debate about presidential succession was as remarkable as the diversity of its support base, which included members of the Nasserist Karama and the Islamist al-Wasat party, under the initial leadership of the leftist Christian George Ishak (Albrecht, 2007; Shorbagy, 2007) . Going further than their nationalist counterparts in Saudi Arabia, their founding document described 'foreign threats' and 'political despotism' as 'a cause and a result of the other' (quoted in Shorbagy, 2007, p. 186) . Even though the ruling regime was not willing to expand the scope of tolerated political activities, unprecedented public protests at least increased the comparatively low costs of suppression which some see as an important factor in the stability of Middle Eastern authoritarianism (Bellin, 2004) .
It was in this context of embryonic street politics and the open online and satellite TV debates about the health and failures of political leaders, torture and the role of religious authorities (Human Rights Watch, 2007; Lynch, 2006; Skovgaard-Petersen, 2006 ) that Arab autocrats realised, a couple of years before their Iranian peers faced a much more serious challenge in the summer of 2009, that 'complex communicative interdependence ' (Schmitter, 2001 ) and a greater 'density of ties' (Levitsky and Way, 2005) can constitute powerful tools of democratic contagion and consent. In 2008, Saudi Arabia and Egypt therefore drew up a 'Charter of Principles for Regulating Satellite Broadcasting in the Arab Region' which allowed the signing Arab governments to suspend or revoke the licences of satellite networks deemed to 'negatively affect social peace, national unity, public order, and public morals' or to 'defame leaders, or national and religious symbols [of other Arab states]' (quoted in Human Rights Watch, 2008).
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It thus becomes clear that the Arab regimes can still rely on two important pillars of authoritarianism in fending off the effects of contagion and consent: scope, needed to stifle opposition systematically through detention and lawsuits, and cohesion, required during a violent crackdown on demonstrations or the outright manipulation of elections ( Way and Levitsky, 2006) . So far,Arab elites have been able to rely on the shrewd manipulation of the rules of the political game to stifle political opposition at a level that escapes broader Western criticism (Kassem, 2004; Lust-Okar, 2005; . They therefore exemplify societies where political elites are still capable of blocking norm empowerment (Checkel, 1997) .
It is in this political context, where control and conditionality might protect nascent domestic calls for political reform from their own governments (Schmitter, 2001) , that contrary to arguments against conditionality (Dalacoura, 2005 ) the reluctance to utilise political conditionality negatively impacts the long-term prospects of political reform in the Middle East.While it would be naïve to ignore the fact that rationally calculating local elites will always be concerned about what they perceive as an externally instigated or sponsored threat to the status they hold or aspire to (Kienle, 2007; Perthes, 2004; Schlumberger, 2006) , 16 external pressure can make a difference in the context of political elites still blocking the spread of human rights and political reform norms by creating some political space for international human rights efforts and discourse to unfold (Sikkink, 2001 ).
Previous case studies have shown that it would suffice to entice governments to shy away from the overt repression of the interaction between national and international nongovernmental organisations, thus creating the breathing space required to allow unthreatening 'learning' to take place. While it is empirically very difficult to establish where strategic bargaining ends and persuasion begins in the institutionalisation of international norms,Thomas Risse and Stephen Ropp (1999) are adamant that norm-violating governments that initially feel pressured to 'talk the talk' in order to generate Western (donor) support ultimately face 'argumentative self-entrapment' which might prevent a retreat to norm-violating behaviour. This begs the question about the extent to which the United States in particular has been prepared for and capable of making use of the tested means of aid allocation, gestures of approval or disapproval and the network of military and security ties (Huntington, 1991; Whitehead, 2001 ) in order to entice/force its authoritarian Arab allies to allow such learning.
Standing at the Sidelines: The United States and the Use of Conditionality
Reflecting the varying degrees of their interdependencies with the United States, Saudi Arabia and Egypt face differing levels of vulnerability or openness to conditionality.While resource rentiers like Saudi Arabia depend on global market conditions beyond their immediate control, they are harder to influence through negative conditionality. In general, US leverage is mostly limited to arms sales and Riyadh's interest in further integrating its economy into global markets, which in both cases is inherently influenced by US Congressional electoral politics. Legislative measures incorporating conditionality thus stand the best chance of Congressional approval when issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the level of the oil price make it politically prudent for the individual member to support them.
Given the different nature of its relationship with the US, Cairo relies to a significant degree on its perceived role as a facilitator of Washington's policies in its attempts to pre-empt negative conditionality on strategic rents, that is, externally extracted income based on the geo-strategic considerations of international actors (Gause, 1995) , which in the case of the more than US$1 billion annual military aid helps the Egyptian regime to double what it is spending on its military (Richter, 2007) . While the decades-long history of Egypt's proWestern foreign policy orientations means that its military already boasts strong ties with Western, and especially US, colleagues, the fact remains that the focus on higher military budgets and continuous technological advancement makes its leaders very interested in maintaining close relations with the United States (Droz-Vincent, 2007). Since highly institutionalised meritocratic militaries are deemed to be more open to political reform and more interested in international ties (Bellin, 2004) , Egypt seems to constitute an example where external encouragement could be especially fruitful. It would thus realise Steven Heydemann's call for targeted attempts to weaken the coalitions on which 'authoritarian upgrading' rests (Heydemann, 2007) .
Partially launched in order to demonstrate that President Bush's focus on democratisation was not all about retrospectively justifying the war in Iraq, the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) provides an example of positive conditionality by offering Arab countries US support in their efforts to join the WTO and establish closer security and military ties with the United States and Europe if they engage in political and economic reforms (Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 2004) . It could therefore have compensated for the lack of a Middle Eastern international organisation which, in other regional contexts, had played a reformconducive role by helping overcome the fears of liberalisation among the ruling elite as the perceived 'external guarantor of rights and preferences, or by altering preferences through a socialization process' (Pevehouse, 2002, p. 525 ).
The initiative's suggestion that the region's civil society organisations, including human rights and media NGOs, should 'operate freely without harassment or restrictions' and receive increased direct funding (Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 2004) promised to address the lack of a sufficient number of truly autonomous civil society actors capable of challenging the 'fear, deference and patterns of social subordination' at the heart of authoritarian rule (Grugel, 1999, p. 19). 17 In the context of weak political parties (Albrecht, 2005; Stacher, 2004) , the GMEI threatened to unravel Cairo's attempts to create a tame civil society whose 'democracy language' had ensured the goodwill of Western donors in times of financial crises (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004) . Ignoring the proposals' emphasis on bottom-up calls for reform, Mubarak and then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah insisted that reforms could not be imposed 'from outside' and had to be in line with 'Arab identity' (quoted in Ghafour, 2004) .
When 74 participants representing 52 civil society organisations from 13 Arab countries met in Beirut in March 2004, they condemned their governments' efforts to invoke 'cultural or religious particularities ... as a pretext to doubt and to question the universality of the principles of human rights', urged Arab governments 'to review and develop the contents of religious discourse with religious or non-religious educational curriculums and to reinvigorate the curriculum with the ideas of religious innovators', and rejected attempts to 'manipulate' the Arab-Israeli conflict and the then ongoing war on terror to justify the slow progress or even lack of political reform (quoted in Faath, 2005, pp. 80-2) .
In the end, Arab governments were able to exploit European scepticism towards an initiative that seemed to overshadow their own cooperation with the region within the Barcelona Process ( Wittes, 2004a) . While stipulating that such acknowledgements should not be exploited to defer reform, the text approved by that year's G8 summit described the Arab-Israeli conflict as 'an important element of progress in the region' and stated that respect for the uniqueness of each country would have to mean that 'each society will reach its own conclusions about the pace and scope of change' (White House, 2004) .
With the war in Iraq putting increasing strains on US diplomatic resources, Arab governments were able to mitigate further the initiative's long-term impact. Its flagship, the Forum for the Future, originally designed as a long-term showcase for Arab civil society activity, ceased to meet after its third annual conference in Amman in 2006. One year earlier, Egypt was able to forestall the gathering's final communiqué by objecting to language that did not safeguard governmental prerogatives in the realm of civil society promotion ( Wright, 2005) . Ironically, the forum itself had turned into a tool of 'authoritarian upgrading', when according to various US and Arab participants these regional gatherings were used to share expertise informally on how to thwart the very initiatives that were being discussed during the formal sessions (Heydemann, 2007) . Washington's first-ever attempt to set up a mechanism for positive conditionality had therefore failed before it was ever genuinely implemented.
The US government tends to demonstrate a similar ambiguity in employing negative conditionality when Arab human rights activists are imprisoned. The success of a strategy to use politically motivated trials to contain domestic calls for political reform rests on the inability of domestic civil society to activate transnational partners who in turn lobby their government to pressure the human rights abusing regime (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) . This 'boomerang pattern' of successful transnational human rights mobilisation depends on the strength and density of the networks, issue resonance and the vulnerability of the target state (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) .
The Egyptian regime faced such mobilisation when a national security court that usually dealt with Islamist terrorists sentenced the prominent Egyptian-American academic and human rights campaigner, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, to seven years of hard labour. Charges such as 'defaming Egypt's image abroad' and 'accepting foreign money without approval of the Ministry of Social Affairs' were based on his outspoken views on Egypt's human rights record and his attempt to raise voter awareness through an EU-funded project. With journalists, human rights activists and a bipartisan coalition of US politicians linking Ibrahim's fate with Washington's nascent freedom agenda, the White House felt compelled publicly to link additional post-9/11 security assistance with the satisfactory solution of Ibrahim's case.While this unprecedented conditioning of bilateral aid to Egypt on a human rights matter ultimately led to Ibrahim's acquittal on 18 March 2003, exactly one day before the US-led invasion of Iraq, it could not save Ibrahim from eventual self-imposed exile.
A similar case occurred when the Egyptian regime misjudged the resonance of its decision to imprison secular Egyptian opposition leader, Ayman Nour, only days after President Bush had declared the spread of freedom to be the central theme of his second term in office (Bush, 2005) against the backdrop of Iraq's first national elections in decades and the election of Mahmud Abbas as the new Palestinian president in early 2005. After Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice more or less publicly considered cancelling a joint summit of the G8 and Arab countries, Hosni Mubarak not only ignored his earlier warnings about the dangers of political reform and announced a constitutional referendum to allow the holding of unprecedented multi-candidate presidential elections, but also allowed Ayman Nour to run for president (Kessler, 2005) .
In Saudi Arabia, a similarly high-profile case occurred in the context of Prince Nayef, the conservative Minister of the Interior, warning that the broadening of the public discourse -condoned and possibly even encouraged by his more liberal half-brother, then Crown Prince Abdullah (Doran, 2004 ) -should still occur within strict limits:'I have said it clearly -no to change, yes to development ... that does not clash with the principles of the nation' (quoted in Jones, 2003, emphasis added) . The signatories of a petition that demanded the establishment of a constitutional monarchy as a way of confronting Islamist terrorism and 'protecting the royal family and Saudi society' could not escape their conviction for 'address[ing] the public and appeal [ing] to it in respect of critical issues concerning the system of rule' and 'criticism of the people charged with authority in the Islamic regime', both arbitrary charges with no legal basis even in Saudi law (Human Rights Watch, 2005a) .
18 Soon after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that 'peacefully petitioning their government ... should not be a crime in any country ' (Rice, 2005) , the new King Abdullah marked his accession to the throne by pardoning the three petitioners.
In both cases,Washington's authoritarian Arab allies knew that seemingly giving in to US demands was a cost-effective way of preventing a White House that treated democracy promotion more as a matter of shaping Western perceptions about its policies than about shaping political realities in the Arab world from seriously contemplating conditionality.
Both countries benefited from the fact that the premise of an insurmountable trade-off between democratisation and regional peace making would seemingly be confirmed by the outcome of the elections for Egypt's national assembly and the Palestinian legislative council in the winter of 2005/6. While some observers saw in the disciplined attendance and attention to legislative details of Muslim Brotherhood assemblymen a chance to overcome the traditional dominance of the executive (Shehata and Stacher, 2006) , their significantly increased representation from 17 to 88 seats and Hamas' narrow yet surprising victory (re)turned attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the supposedly negative consequences of the precipitous introduction of elections.
Political elites in Saudi Arabia, for instance, viewed the Bush administration's successful campaign to generate Congressional approval for Saudi Arabia's 2005 accession to the WTO as part of a return to closer strategic cooperation strained by 9/11 and the war in Iraq. 19 In Egypt, the announcement of departing US ambassador David Welch that USAID would grant funds to NGOs with direct political goals, including Saad Eddin Ibrahim's Ibn Khaldun Centre, was unprecedented, yet limited in scope. 20 The more profound decision to postpone, in the spirit of positive conditionality, discussions on a free trade agreement was mostly a reaction to the increasing frequency of open Congressional criticism of Egypt's human rights record, particularly Congress' irritation about Cairo's decision to end the politically motivated trial against Ayman Nour with a predetermined conviction (Dumke, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2005b) . 21 Finally, the Bush administration made use of its Congressional allies to pre-empt or water down timid attempts to establish negative conditionality demanded by democracy promotion practitioners (Hamzawy and McFaul, 2006; Heydemann, 2007) .When supporters of a stronger Congressional stance on political reform in Egypt were finally able to push through an amendment to an omnibus spending bill for 2008 s. 690 ) that withheld $100 million in aid to Egypt until the Secretary of State certified that the Egyptian government had undertaken steps to 'protect the independence of the judiciary', 'curb police abuses' and clamp down on the smuggling network between Egypt and Gaza, Secretary Rice made use of a national security waiver included in the aforementioned bill and released all funds. Nevertheless, the Egyptian side deemed this new Congressional attitude serious enough to set up an Egyptian-American parliamentary exchange programme led by Mustafa al-Feki, chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee in the Egyptian people's assembly, and frequently staffed by members of Gamal Mubarak's inner circle (Essam El-Din, 2008) .
In light of the mismatch between rhetoric and political reality in the Bush administration's 'freedom agenda', Michael McFaul, Barack Obama's campaign adviser on democratisation and first Russia expert at the new national security council, suggested that the new administration would go about democratisation 'more effectively':
The Obama administration must talk less and do more. President Bush delivered several lofty speeches explaining why the United States should promote freedom, yet Ayman Nour sits in jail in Egypt. Rather than speeches or even grand goals, the next administration should seek to achieve small, concrete outcomes that advance political freedoms in very tangible ways and do so, without talking about doing so (McFaul, 2008) .
In reality, however, the Obama administration offered a mixture of less rhetoric and even less action on political reform. First, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told Egyptian TV that 'conditionality is not our policy ' (quoted in Schemm, 2009 ). Second, the Obama administration eliminated the direct funding of civil society organisations (Traub, 2009 ). Third, the Obama administration dramatically decreased 'rule of law and human rights' funding and civil society assistance to Egypt to $8 million and $7 million, respectively, in fiscal year 2010 from the $18 million and $31.75 million the Bush administration spent in 2008 (Freedom House, 2009b, p. 45) .
The Obama administration's attempt to impel the Arab world to make grand gestures towards Israel as a way of starting a new round of peace negotiations also increased Saudi Arabia's leverage as a perceived regional diplomatic heavyweight (Henderson, 2009) . This is in addition to Riyadh's status as the world's largest oil supplier, which will continue to shield its continually problematic human rights record from serious Western pressure. That is why Saudi Arabia's political elite feels compelled to dismiss any talk about Western 'energy independence' brought about by technological advancement and alternative sources of energy as 'demagoguery' (Al-Faisal, 2009 ).
Washington's new geo-strategic outlook has prompted veterans of US democratisation efforts to warn against playing down democracy promotion in an effort to distance the Obama administration from the more controversial policies of its predecessor. This would be 'a historic mistake, paralleling the Bush administration's "ABC (anything but Clinton)" error in initially discarding the Arab-Israeli peace process' (Dunne, 2009, p. 130) .
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that, contrary to the grand rhetoric of the Bush administration and the assumptions of its many critics (Kienle, 2007) , US foreign policy decision makers have still not implemented democracy promotion in the Middle East as a foreign policy goal in its own right. Instead, the assumptions provided by modernisation theory have provided a fall-back option for US policy makers unwilling or unable to pursue a more vigorous approach to democratisation in the Arab world.
This approach continues to provide inadequate results for two reasons. First, the link between economic and political reform is not as straightforward as postulated. Second, a vicious circle exists linking authoritarian political structures, the failure to address increasing social and economic inequalities and the perceived need to limit further the available political space. Third, even when modernisation processes spur the development of conditions conducive to democratic reform by raising education levels, authoritarian Arab governments have a proven track record of adapting to the accompanying challenge of a more outspoken public. This puts the onus on those international actors who have the capacity to increase the costs for suppressing clearly visible instances of democratic contagion and consent.
That is why the selective and, at best, half-hearted approach President Bush adopted in his two terms in office is so important. It laid the foundation for a decade of lost opportunities created by domestic calls for political change in both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The claim that conditionality does not work is therefore not based on sufficient empirical evidence. It has never been consistently implemented.
Empirical evidence presented here indicates that a combination of the US-inspired 'conflict' approach aimed at empowering specific actors and the more cautious 'norms' approach commonly associated with EU human rights promotion policies suggested by Peter Burnell (2005) is applicable to the Middle East as well. As demonstrated above, conditionality has an important role to play in both instances, especially when more direct means of intervention such as financial support to specific organisations either remain subject to accusations of neo-imperialist interference or run into the problem of creating a class of human rights campaigners seemingly detached from the concerns of their fellow citizens (Abdel Rahman, 2002; Langohr, 2004) . First, positive and negative conditionality can be employed to make the clampdown on domestic actors who peacefully work towards political and social change much more costly for the incumbent regimes than is the case at the moment. By changing the cost-benefit calculus of political elites who have been able, up until now, to rely on regime scope and cohesion to curtail freedom of association, expression and demonstration, the US government would go a long way towards empowering local actors who are willing and able to suggest and promote local solutions to local problems. Second, increasing the political breathing room for local actors would also stimulate and safeguard those processes of norm empowering and learning that recent analyses of ways to promote human rights protection have emphasised. As such the use of conditionality would constitute the 'missing link' not only in the analysis of authoritarian resilience but also between US and EU attempts to formulate coherent democratisation strategies. 
Notes
1 General overviews and comparisons of democracy promotion are offered by Burnell, 2005; Carothers, 1999; Cox et al., 2000; Kopstein, 2006 . Carapico (2002 focuses on the Middle East in particular. Brynen et al. (1995) contains more optimistic assessments of the chances and limits of liberalisation in the post-Cold War Arab world. Reflecting a recent trend in the academic literature, Brownlee (2007) , Schlumberger (2007) , Lust-Okar (2005) and Kassem (2004) focus on the sources of continued authoritarian resilience.
